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Revolution, Routine and Social Change  
 
Carolyn Pedwell, SSPSSR, University of Kent, UK 
 
Abstract 
In the wake of the ‘turn to affect’, compelling scholarly work has explored the 
vital role affect, emotion and feeling might play in catalyzing radical social and 
political change.  I argue, however, that some narratives of ‘affective revolution’ 
may actually do more to obscure than to enrich our understanding of the 
material relations and routines though which ‘progressive’ change might occur 
and endure in a given context - while side-stepping the challenge of how to 
evaluate progress itself in the current socio-political and economic landscape. 
Drawing on the work of Eve Sedgwick (1996, 2003, 2011), John Dewey 
([1922]2012), Felix Ravaisson ([1838]2008) and others, this article asks 
whether critical work on habit can provide different, and potentially fruitful, 
conceptual terrain for understanding the contemporary ethical and material 
complexities of social stasis and transformation.  I suggest that it is precisely 
habit’s double nature – its enabling of both ‘addiction’ and ‘grace’ (Malabou, 
2008: viii) – that makes it a rich concept for addressing the propensity of 
harmful socio-political patterns to persist in the face of efforts to generate 
greater awareness of their damaging effects, as well as the material forms of 
automation and coordination on which meaningful societal transformation may 
depend.  I also explore how bringing affect and habit together might productively 
refigure our understandings of ‘the present’ and ‘social progress’, as well as the 
available modes of sensing, instigating and responding to change.  In turning to 
habit, then, the primary aim of this article is to examine how social and cultural 
theory might critically re-approach social change and progressive politics today.  
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In the wake of the ‘turn to affect’, stimulating scholarly work has explored the 
vital role affect, emotion and feeling might play in catalyzing radical social and 
political change.  Such narratives of ‘affective revolution’ are often rich and 
inspiring.  My sense, however, is that some of these analyses may actually do 
more to obscure than to enrich our understanding of how ‘progressive’ change 
might occur and endure in a given context - while side-stepping the challenge of 
how to evaluate progress itself in the current socio-political landscape.  As such, 
this article asks whether critical work on habit can provide different, and 
potentially fruitful, conceptual terrain for understanding the ethical and material 
complexities of social stasis and transformation.  It also explores how bringing 
affect and habit together might productively refigure our understandings of ‘the 
present’ and ‘social progress’, as well as the available modes of sensing, 
instigating and responding to change.  In turning to habit, then, my primary aim 
in this article is to examine how social and cultural theory might critically re-
approach both social change and progressive politics today.  
 
In the first section, I consider how recent scholarly engagements with affect and 
emotion, and particularly writing on the politics of empathy, has offered a 
compelling conceptual vocabulary for addressing the embodied dynamics of 
social transformation.  I argue, however, that although these narratives offer 
seductive explanations of how affect can spark mind-body change, they tend to 
provide less convincing accounts of the material processes and infrastructures 
through which such change might endure.  Narratives of empathy’s power to 
ignite personal and collective transformation could also be seen to offer a 
‘paranoid’ understanding of social change (Sedgwick, 1996, 2003).  That is, they 
assume that progressive transformation is precipitated (and perhaps even 
guaranteed) through acts of exposure that produce greater cognitive and 
affective knowledge.  Yet as Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick and others have incisively 
arguedi, there is no necessary or inevitable correlation between the creation of 
more (or better) knowledge and progressive social change.   
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The remainder of the paper thus explores how we might differently encounter 
contemporary socio-political dynamics through analysis of habit.  Bringing the 
work of John Dewey, Felix Ravaisson and William James together with that of 
contemporary scholars, the second section introduces the concept of ‘habit’ and 
traces some of its intellectual and political genealogies.  Because habituation 
tends to be associated most strongly with mindless repetition, and hence the 
reproduction of the status quo, I suggest, scholars and activists engaged in 
projects of social justice have stressed the need to expose and disrupt pernicious 
habits.  They have thus paid less attention to how habit formation may be 
integral to substantive personal and socio-political change.ii   Yet, it is precisely 
habit’s double nature – its enabling of both ‘addiction’ and ‘grace’ (Malabou, 
2008: viii) - that makes it a rich concept for addressing the propensity of harmful 
socio-political patterns to persist in the face of widespread awareness of their 
damaging effects, as well as the material forms of automation and coordination 
on which meaningful transformation may depend.   
 
I develop these arguments further in the third section through a more detailed 
engagement with Dewey’s analysis of the links between habit, feeling and 
progressive social reform.  Like Sedgwick, I suggest, Dewey is suspicious of 
approaches to personal or social transformation that depend exclusively on the 
acquisition of greater cognitive or affective knowledge, not least because they 
have difficulty engaging effectively with the (often unconscious) psychical, 
physiological and environmental processes central to embodied regression and 
change.  Instead, he advocates a speculative mode of social intervention oriented 
towards habit and the workings of ‘mind-body-environmental assemblages’ 
(Bennett et al, 2013).  Given the impossibility of calculating precisely how the 
future will unfold, Dewey contends, we cannot preemptively dictate either the 
nature of ethical conduct or the necessary path towards greater social justice.  
Our focus, rather, needs to be on approaching ‘progress’ though efforts to 
engender an ‘increase in present meaning’ ([1922]2012: 110), while remaining 
open to the unexpected, and hence to change.  In these ways, Dewey’s analysis of 
the possibilities of habit resonates with Sedgwick’s (2003) description of 
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‘reparation’ as a mode of social engagement attuned to inhabiting the present in 
all its ambivalence and complexity.   
 
The fourth and final section examines some of the risks and possibilities of a 
‘politics of habit’, focusing on the links between habit modification and 
pernicious modes of subjectification and governmentality.  I argue that, while 
habit is not easily disentangled from its colonialist, fascist and neoliberal legacies 
(and indeed we must remain attuned to their continuing effects), they do 
nonetheless not determine its potential.  Affirmative possibilities exist for 
engagement with habit to furnish a renewed pragmatist politics, informed by 
feminist, queer and decolonial analysis, that approaches social change though 
experimental action addressing the environments and infrastructures that ‘feed’ 
habits as well as the cognitive, psychosocial and physiological processes of which 
habit is comprised (Sullivan, 2005, 2015; Connolly, 2013).  While this approach 
is wary of over-investing in the promise of sweeping revolutionary change, it 
does not dismiss the importance of radical imagination and praxis, or the utility 
of certain aspects of ‘paranoid’ critique.  Its emphasis, rather, is on approaching 
progressive social change through an understanding of the imbrication of the 
revolutionary and the routine - engaging the relationship between the force of 
affective sparks and the ongoing coordination and adaptation of habits.  
 
Affect, emotion and social change  
 
As Sedgwick discussed in her powerful discussion of what Paul Ricoeur called 
‘the hermeneutics of suspicion’ (Sedgwick, 1996, 2003, 2011), we have, within 
‘critical’ social and cultural analysis, become very skilled at tracing the workings 
of power and domination - at providing sophisticated analysis of how 
essentialism, stereotyping, silencing, appropriation and discipline operate, and 
showing how what might look progressive or transgressive at first glance is in 
fact simply another reproduction of normative relations of power.iii  In turn, we 
routinely point to various socio-political interventions that might lead to desired 
changes – from education and consciousness raising, to political protest and 
social movement building, to policy change and legal intervention, to alternative 
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economic planning and others forms of structural overhaul.  And yet, we have 
remained comparatively limited in our capacity to explain how – through what 
specific material processes and mechanisms - social transformation might actually 
happen.  More specifically, we find it difficult to account for what it is that 
enables people (students, policy-makers, journalists, capitalists, teachers, 
university administrators, activists, bloggers, voters, the middle classes, 
conservatives, white liberals, men etc.) to change their everyday behavior and 
act more consistently in ways that might be more conductive to particular 
‘progressive’ aims - without assuming that human subjects are wholly self-
determining or indeed separate from non-human actors, structures and 
dynamics.  In this context, across a range of fields - and particularly those 
concerned with ‘projects of social justice’ - diverse engagements with emotion, 
affect and feeling have offered compelling ways to explain the possibilities of 
progressive social change.   
 
Of all the emotions, empathy – which may be understood as the act of  
‘imaginatively experiencing the feelings, thoughts and situations of another’ 
(Chabot Davis, 2004: 403) or as a more embodied and sensorial practice of 
affective attunement – is the one most commonly linked to the promise of self 
and social transformation.  Indeed, across both mainstream and critical 
literatures, there has been a widespread investment in the power of empathy to 
spur a kind of affective revolution at the level of the subject or the collective.  The 
idea here is that, in being made to feel deep empathy - whether this is by 
government officials being exposed to the visceral reality of poverty in the Global 
South through Immersions programs in international development, or by 
privileged white university students reading African American slave narrativesiv 
- subjects or groups will be so profoundly affected that they will never be the 
same again: their views of the world will be radically transformed, as will their 
behavior and actions, in the interests of greater social justice (whatever ‘social 
justice’ might mean in a given context).  A key point in these accounts, then, is 
that, while we might theorise social inequalities and commit ourselves to social 
obligations in the abstract, a transformation at the affective level is required to 
make us actually feel, realise and act on such responsibilities.  
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Clearly, this is a narrative of progressive social transformation that depends on a 
radical affective break, a rupture of consciousness that acts as a catalyst for 
creating personal and collective change.  It is a model of change premised on a 
powerful spark of emotional recognition that catapults forth new forms 
‘knowing that transform the self who knows’ (Bartky, 1996: 179).  Yet is this how 
‘progressive’ change - or indeed any enduring social change – actually works?  
Does a radical break or a revolution of the subject at the cognitive, psychic, and/ 
or affective level provide the basis for sustained behavioral, institutional or 
environmental transformation at a deep embodied, material and structural level?  
Or is such affective change often more likely to be fleeting, disorienting or merely 
productive of an individualist mode of affective politics divorced from wider 
structural relations of power?  With respect to questions of temporality, these 
seductive narratives of empathic social transformation are often teleological: 
they imagine a telos or end point at which social and political tensions will be 
eased and antagonisms rectified.  As such, the focus in these affective accounts is 
never really on life in the present, but rather always on a better future on the 
horizon.  Such perspectives, then, tend to not to be attuned to, on the one hand, 
the material workings of change active in the present, or, on the other hand, the 
ways in which established expectations of ‘progress’ have been compromised in 
the wake of post-Fordist economic, social and political configurations (Freeman, 
2010; Berlant, 2011) - points which I address in further detail later on.   
 
The underlying assumption of many calls for empathy - or indeed other 
emotions, whether compassion, hope, shame or anger - as affective panacea 
seems to be that, deep down, people are capable of acting ‘ethically’, but are 
routinely prevented from doing so because they are too busy, too ignorant, or 
too isolated from the ‘reality’ of the injustice that others endure.  If people 
(especially those in positions of social privilege and power) could only be 
affected powerfully enough, through being exposed to the visceral truth of 
others’ suffering - and their own complicity in it - such narratives suggest, they 
would be compelled to fundamentally alter their ways of seeing and being in the 
world.  Yet it is this cluster of assumptions that I have now come to find most 
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troubling – the belief not only that we can know in advance what it means to act 
‘ethically’ or ‘progressively’ across a range of different contexts and situations, 
but also that the shock of greater affective knowledge is capable of transforming 
human behavior in line with such ethical imperatives.  How to make sense of the 
relationship between individual action, environmental conditions and structural 
relations of power is, of course, another longstanding question that many who 
over-invest in empathy’s transformative political promise have difficulty 
engaging with critically in any sustained way.    
 
Beyond the writing on empathy, an implicit model of social change premised on 
the force of exposure and revelation appears in more or less sophisticated forms 
across a wide range of progressive scholarly analysis, including strands of my 
own previous work.  Invoking Sedgwick’s legacy, we might say that it is 
representative of much wider affective habits in critical theory.  In her discussion 
of the dynamics of feeling at stake in what she, drawing on the work of the 
psychoanalyst Melanie Klein, called ‘paranoid’ and ‘reparative’ reading, Sedgwick 
was interested in how we have come to understand politically-engaged, left-
leaning, social and cultural analysis as requiring a mode of critique premised on 
suspicion and paranoia.  Paranoia is a style of interpretation characterised by an 
implicit assumption that we already know what is ‘good’ and ‘bad’ for us – and 
social and political life more generally – and that we therefore can split 
knowledges and practices into those likely to work in the interests of ‘social 
justice’ and those likely to work against it.  Paranoid reading is thus fuelled by a 
state of constant anxiety and alertness focused on detecting and exposing ‘the 
bad’ (essentialism, binary-thinking, liberal adherence to the status quo) in the 
belief that making what is bad visible is what is most required to eradicate or 
change it.  As such, ‘paranoia requires that bad news be already known’, and this 
means that the analysis it generates is often circular and foreclosing of discovery 
(2003:130).  From Sedgwick’s perspective, paranoid modes of interpretation 
therefore tend to be limited in their capacity to either recognise or produce 
change, and remain particularly naïve about the complexities of social 
transformation.  Generating more - or more accurate - knowledge about a 
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particular phenomenon does not necessarily do anything, or at least does not 
necessarily do what we think or hope it will.  
 
Clearly, not all writing about the links between affect and social change bears the 
features of the narratives of empathy described above.  Visions of affective 
transformation informed by the continental philosophy of Baruch Spinoza and 
Gilles Deleuze, for instance, do not subscribe to linear notions of time and social 
progress, nor do they invest in emotional identification as a driver of change.  
Yet, in some important respects, I want to argue, they resonate with the earlier 
accounts of empathy.  Indeed, many Deleuzian-inspired narratives focus on 
encounters that produce ‘a shock to thought’, an affective jolt that can catapult us 
involuntarily into critical inquiry (Massumi, 2002; see also Bennett, 2005; Amin 
and Thrift, 2013).  Such experiences, it is suggested, have the potential to move 
us beyond pre-set narratives, opening up a more radical space for political and 
ethical engagement.  While these accounts do not offer a teleological vision of 
social progress, they nonetheless invest in the power of an affective break or 
upheaval to enable critical change.  Granted, most theorists of affect working in 
the Spinoza-Deleuze tradition would not attribute straightforward causality to 
affect (i.e. affect causes change); rather, affect, from this perspective, is 
understood as a potential or capacity - ‘a body’s capacity to affect and be affected’ 
(original italics, Gregg and Siegworth, 2010: 3). Nonetheless, causality is 
complex, rather than absent, here, given that affect is also frequently figured as a 
catalyzing force, as that which ‘can serve to drive us toward movement, toward 
thought and extension’ (2010: 1).  So, while affect might not be conceived as that 
which causes change, it is frequently described as that which enables or drives 
transformation – a subtle distinction.  Indeed, what is valued in such narratives is 
the promise of those fugitive affective moments in which thought might escape 
the discursive relations of power that normally constrain it, allowing something 
genuinely different to emerge.  Whether or not we are convinced by the claim 
that affect can move fully outside of discursive forms of mediation (I have my 
doubts), my point here is that, across varied accounts of affective social 
transformation, we are offered enticing accounts of how affect might spark 
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embodied change, but less compelling explanations of the processes through 
which that change might produce effects that endure.  
 
These observations concerning the limits of contemporary engagements with 
affect, emotion and social change have led me to ask: Might focusing on habit 
help reorient theories of affective transformation, enabling us to grapple not only 
with how patterns of action (personal, institutional, environmental) become 
deeply ingrained, but also how new modes of socio-political engagement and 
responsivity might be actualized and sustained?  And might it do so in ways that 
refigure dominant binaries of cognition and embodiment, individual and 
environment, and human and non-human, while troubling linear notions of time 
and progress?  In posing these questions, it is important to underscore that I do 
not see ‘affect’, ‘emotion’ and ‘habit’ as radically different and discrete concepts, 
but rather as related and overlapping ones.  We can consider, for instance, how 
certain emotional responses become habitual over time, and thus how we 
routinely engage in practices of ‘affective citation’ (Wetherall, 2013).  Indeed, 
while fuelling explanations of social change, theories of affect have also 
underscored powerful interpretations of political stasis and ‘stuckness’ - from 
Sara Ahmed’s analysis of how ‘emotions can attach us to the very conditions of 
our subordination’ (2004: 12), to Lauren Berlant’s (2011) account of how ‘cruel 
optimism’ keeps us locked into self-defeating efforts to pursue ‘the good life’ in 
deteriorating conditions of social and economic opportunity.  Yet key accounts of 
habit also pay attention to the role of affect in the formation of new embodied 
capacities and routines, as well as to the vital function of feeling in signaling 
when our unconscious habits have been disrupted.  We might go as far to say 
then that there is no habit without affect - though the affective components of 
some habits may be non-conscious or unconscious (Sullivan, 2015).  My aim here 
is thus not to laud the possibilities afforded by the substitution of one critical 
paradigm (affect) by another (habit); rather, I want to examine how our 
understandings of contemporary affective forms of embodied and socio-political 
stasis, regression and change might be enriched though engaging more 
substantively with the workings of habit.    
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Genealogies of habit  
 
Intellectual concern with habit has been prominent (if not widespread) in 
contemporary social and cultural theory – from Michel Foucault’s work on the 
embodied micro-politics of discipline, to Pierre Bourdieu’s analysis of socio-
economic class and habitus, to Judith Butler’s examination of the performative 
and iterative constitution of gender.  The concept of habit was also important to 
classical sociological theorists, such as Gabriel Tarde, Max Weber and Emile 
Durkheim, with the latter viewing it as ‘a chief determinant of human action’ and 
one of the ‘principle supports for the moral fabric of modern societies’ (Camic, 
1986: 1039).  In the realm of philosophy, reflection on the links between habit 
and human activity (which can be traced at least as far back as Aristotle) 
developed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries through the work 
of the American pragmatist philosophers William James and John Dewey. 
Contending that we are all merely ‘bundles of habits’, James, who was trained as 
a medical doctor and psychologist, took particular interest in the psychic, neural 
and physiological working of habituation ([1914]2004: 1).  Similarly, Dewey, 
who drew on philosophy and social psychology to approach educational reform, 
suggested that, while we tend to think of ‘bad habits’ as exerting a foreign power 
over us, in actuality, habit ‘has this power because it is so intimately part of 
ourselves…. we are the habit’ ([1922]2012: 14).  For these thinkers, habit was 
central to our everyday conduct as well as to wider socio-political processes of 
reproduction and transformation.  More recently, there has been renewed 
interest in the legacy of habit in continental philosophy, namely the work of the 
French philosopher Felix Ravaisson ([1838]2008).v  Here, the focus is on role of 
habit in processes of being and becoming - in the transformation of ‘a power of 
moving or of acting into a tendency to move or act in a particular way’ (Carlisle 
and Sinclair, 2008: 13, original italics).  Together, this work compels us to 
contemplate habit’s potential - beyond its association with mindless repetition - 
as an embodied technology of freedom and change.   
 
However, extending Foucault’s legacy, contemporary engagements with habit 
also reflect on its role in pernicious modes of discipline and governmentality.  As 
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Tony Bennett et al argue, in positioning particular (racialised, classed, gendered 
and colonised) populations as lacking in the capacity for will ‘due to the 
excessive sway of habit’, political, medical and scientific authorities did much in 
the late 19th century to ensure that the capacity for freedom and self-governance 
was differentially distributed (2013: 6).vi  And yet, for those positioned as ‘slaves 
to habit’, such authorities nonetheless prescribed ‘a reinforcement of the 
disciplinary rigors of habit as the only effective means of guiding conduct’ (6).  
This assumed divide between ‘will’ and ‘habit’ informed many scholarly 
mediations of habit at the time, including Durkheim’s ‘hierarchical conception of 
the relations between primitive and civilized races’ (11; see also Blackman, 
2013).  Its logic also permeates contemporary state practices of governing 
marginalised groups, from the Australian Aborigines to the British ‘underclass’ 
(15).  Indeed, habit modification remains of primary political tactic of managing 
populations – as is evident in the embracing of ‘nudge theory’vii by both the 
Obama administration and the UK’s Conservative-led coalition government as 
means of ‘nudging’ individuals into developing healthier habits with respect to 
diet, exercise, smoking and social behavior through ‘manipulating their 
environments’ (Burgess, 2012: 3).  Eschewing increased regulation for 
intervention at the level of habit, this melding of behavioral economics and social 
psychology is the latest development in neoliberal forms of governance 
concerned to promote ‘greater individual responsibility’ (3).viii  In this age of 
digital technology, we might also consider how our social media practices are 
tracked by corporations that use them to shape our consumer habits (Duhigg, 
2012), as well as the range of digital applications available for self-tracking 
embodied processes, from calorie-consumption, to sleep patterns, to fertility 
(Coleman, 2014; Lupton, 2014; Dow Schüll, 2016).  Habit-tracking technologies 
and algorithms are also, of course, central to contemporary practices of 
securitization and the particular geo-political disciplining of bodies and borders 
they produce (Amoore, 2013). 
 
Developing Bourdieu’s work, as well as the insights of phenomenology, 
psychoanalysis and pragmatism, feminist, anti-racist and other critical social 
theorists have also long focused on the habitual ways in which social privilege is 
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perpetuated.  Drawing on the work of Frantz Fanon and Julia Kristeva, Iris 
Marion Young influentially argued that cultural imperialism and racism are often 
sustained through habitual ‘aversive or anxious reactions to the bodily presence 
of others’, which are frequently ‘exhibited by liberal-minded people who intend 
to treat everyone with equal respect’ (1990: 11).   Importantly, for Young – as 
well as for scholars writing more recently, such as Shannon Sullivan (2005, 
2015) in her analysis of the habits of white privilege and racist oppression - 
repeated affective reactions at the micro level are central to the reproduction of 
structural relations of power at the macro level.  From Young’s perspective, the 
only way to address pernicious embodied habits is to ‘politicize’ them, a process 
requiring ‘a kind of social therapy’ which could be mobilised through ‘the 
processes of politicized personal discussion that social movements have come to 
call “consciousness raising”’ (1990: 153).  Yet, as Sullivan (2005) argues, 
bringing problematic habits to conscious awareness is not easy or 
straightforward, not least because of the psychic workings of unconscious 
repression and resistance.  It is also interesting to note that, while many critical 
scholars underscore the importance of becoming more aware of problematic 
individual and institutional habits in order to disrupt them, there is much less 
focus in these literatures on the productive role that habit formation might play 
in engendering more equitable, inclusive or affirming social relations and spaces 
(Noble, 2012).  What, we might ask, happens after our oppressive or status-quo-
enabling habits are unsettled or disrupted?  
 
These observations point to the paradox at the root of the concept of habit: On 
the one hand, ‘habit’ conjures unthinking reflex, mindless repetition, and hence 
stasis.  Yet, on the other hand, without the formation of enduring habits, no 
substantive embodied, social or political change can take shape, and become 
rooted enough to sustain.  Catherine Malabou (2008) animates this tension in 
her introduction to the English translation of Felix Ravaisson’s book, Of Habit, 
first published in 1838.  Here, she identifies two key European philosophical 
genealogies of habit: Firstly, a line of analysis beginning with Descartes and 
moving through Kant, which understands habit as automated repetition that is 
antithetical to critical thinking, wonder and change; and secondly, an older 
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tradition emerging with Aristotle, taken up by Hegel and resonant with more 
recent philosophers as Henri Bergson and Deleuze, which conceptualises habit 
as the essence of being and becoming.  From this latter perspective, pioneered in 
Ravaisson’s work, habit involves a repetition, but it is a repetition that produces 
a difference; that is, ‘an aptitude for change’ (Malabou, 2008: ix; see also Deleuze, 
[1968]2011).ix  In transforming a potentiality into a tendency through the work 
of repetition, habit illustrates powerfully that ‘if being was able to change once, 
in the manner of contracting a habit, it can change again.  It is available for a 
change to come’ (2008: viii).  In temporal terms then, habit is ‘a past (as result), 
but this past makes possible a future’ (viii).  
 
From Malabou’s perspective, we have perhaps become habituated to the first 
understanding (habit as automated repetition).  Yet we might productively 
return to the second, older, conceptualisation (habit as being and becoming), and 
indeed, develop a critical appreciation of how the first and second views of habit 
are always mutually informing one another.  This is precisely how Malabou 
interprets Ravaisson’s analysis: he demonstrates that there can never be being 
and becoming without some degree of automated repetition, for it is one and the 
same force that produces habit as ‘grace’ (ease, facility, power) and as ‘addiction’ 
(machinic repetition) (Malabou, 2008: viii).  However, while Malabou invokes 
Ravaisson’s work to invigorate contemporary critical theory, it is important to 
remember that the origins of his analysis of habit were, in essence, theological.x 
Thus, when Ravaisson associates habit with ‘grace’, this refers not only to how, 
via repetition, particular behaviors become more precise and effortless, but also 
to how, through habit, ‘divine grace is appropriated by human beings’, who 
nonetheless remain subject to God’s power (Carlisle, 2014: 115).xi  Significantly, 
integrating habit into Christian Salvationist frameworks in this way ‘provided 
the basis for the organization and exercise of pastoral power’, which, as Bennett 
notes, citing Foucault, ‘consisted in its “claim to the daily government of men in 
their real life on the ground of their salvation and on the scale of humanity 
(Foucault, 2007: 148 cited in Bennett, 2015: 17).  Given these genealogies, it 
should be emphasized that care (and a degree of caution) is required in 
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mobilizing historical figures such as Ravaisson for the work of contemporary 
critical theory and politics - a point which I return to later on.     
 
Nonetheless, various contemporary critical theorists have addressed habit’s 
double-nature, as articulated by Ravaisson, in relation to the workings of social 
change.  Sullivan argues, for example, that habits are both limiting and enabling:  
Habit ‘circumscribes the possibilities for one’s action such that not all modes of 
engagement are available, but it also is an important means by which a person 
can act effectively in the world.’  As such, ‘freedom and power are found in and 
through the constitution of habits, not through their elimination (2005: 24).xii  
Relatedly, Elizabeth Grosz suggests that habit can be understood as ‘a 
fundamentally creative capacity that produces the possibility of stability in a 
universe in which change is fundamental’ (2013: 219).  Indeed, in the midst of 
life’s ongoing transformation, habit acts as ‘an anchor, the rock to which 
possibilities of personal identity are tethered, a condition under which learning 
is possible, the creation of a direction, a “second nature”, an identity’ (219).  
From these perspectives, it is precisely the consolidation and automation of habit 
that might enable both creativity and transformation.  
 
But what exactly is a ‘habit’? Before exploring the links between habit, stasis and 
change in further depth, it is useful to consider a couple of the most suggestive 
descriptions of the embodied mechanisms of habit and habituation:  For William 
James, habit is defined by two key criteria: firstly, a habit simplifies the 
movements required to achieve a given result, while also making them more 
accurate and diminishing fatigue ([1914]2004: 26).  For example, ‘a lock works 
better after being used for some time; at the outset more force was required to 
overcome a certain roughness in its mechanism.  The overcoming of their 
resistance is a phenomenon of habituation’ (7).  Secondly, a habit diminishes the 
conscious attention with which acts are performed (31).  Indeed, from James’ 
perspective, habits (even complex ones) are ‘nothing but the concatenated 
discharges of the nerve-centres, due to the presence there of systems of reflex 
paths, organized as to wake each other up successfully’ (13).  This means that, in 
order for any new habit to emerge, repetition is vital: A tendency towards a 
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particular mode of action ‘only becomes effectively ingrained in us in proportion 
to the uninterrupted frequency with which the actions actually occurs and the 
brain “grows” of their use’ (61).  Nonetheless, James does not see habit as 
disconnected from will and consciousness, a point underscored by the fact that 
the ‘usually inattentive’ sensations of habit will ‘immediately call our attention if 
they go wrong’ (43).  
 
Like James, John Dewey understands habits as involving forms of embodied 
automation enabled by specific material processes: ‘habit is impossible without 
setting up a mechanism of action, physiologically engrained, which operates 
“spontaneously”, automatically, whenever the cue is given’ ([1922]2012: 26).  He 
also similarly claims that that ‘the more suavely efficient a habit the more 
unconsciously it operates’ (71).  Nonetheless, in contrast to James (as well as 
Ravaisson, Deleuze and contemporary theorists such as Grosz), Dewey does not 
see repetition as the essence of habit:  A ‘tendency to repeat acts is an incident of 
many habits, but not all’ (19).  Rather, habit takes shape as ‘an acquired 
predisposition to ways and modes of response’ (19).  It is: 
 
[H]uman activity which is influenced by prior activity and in that sense 
acquired; which contains within itself a certain ordering or 
systematization of minor elements of action; which is projective, dynamic 
in quality, ready for overt manifestation; and which is operative in some 
subdued form even when not obviously dominating activity (19).   
 
While James sometimes relies on an individualist language of habit formation, 
Dewey pays much more attention to the ways in which habits are produced 
through the ‘cooperation of an organism and an environment’ (10), and hence 
how they constitutively imbricate individual bodies and structural and 
environmental conditions.  Also, in comparison to Ravaisson, and other theorists 
interested in how intervention at the level of habit makes possible particular 
futures, Dewey is more interested in the role of habit in the present, a point I will 
return to later on.  Finally, of all the theorists addressed above, Dewey is perhaps 
most explicitly concerned with the relationship between habit and projects of 
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social justice.  In the next section, I will flesh out aspects of this line of Dewey’s 
thought and its implications for contemporary theories of social change 
premised on exposure, knowledge and the force of affect.  
 
Dewey: Inhabiting the present  
 
The most powerful aspect of Dewey’s work for the discussion at hand is his claim 
that questions of moral or ethical conduct cannot be divided from human 
psychology and physiology, or from wider environmental and structural 
conditions and relations.  Indeed, from his perspective, morals and ethics must 
be thought of as materialist and fundamentally linked to embodied processes of 
habituation.  Throughout his book Human Nature and Conduct: An Introduction 
to Social Psychology ([1922]2012), Dewey is critical of modes of social reform 
that depend predominantly on thought (i.e. through verbal instruction of 
particular moral imperatives) or the production of certain feelings (i.e. through 
the generation of empathy, compassion, or moral indignation).  The problem 
with both strategies, he argues, is that they remove thought from embodied 
action and the individual from the environment.  That is, they assume that 
exposure to new knowledge is enough to instigate and implement ‘ethical’ or 
‘progressive’ personal and institutional change, without attending to the 
imbricated embodied and environmental factors that work powerfully to 
support and perpetuate existing patterns and behavior.   
 
With respect to moral instruction in particular, Dewey suggests, it simply does 
not follow that if you instruct or show someone what ‘the right’ thing to do is, 
that it will actually happen.  Here, he employs the example of the ineffectiveness 
of repeatedly telling someone with a problem with his posture to ‘stand up 
straight’.  The assumption that verbal instruction or visual demonstration is all 
that is required here implies that ‘the failure to stand erect is wholly a matter of 
failure of purpose and desire’ ([1922]2012: 15).  Yet, as Dewey stresses, ‘A man 
who does not stand properly forms a habit of standing improperly, a positive, 
forceful habit [...] conditions have been formed for producing a bad result, and 
the bad result will occur as long as those conditions exist’ (15).  Moreover, 
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compelling subjects to focus on what is wrong, on what they should not be doing, 
could be the worst possible approach because it maintains attention on ‘the bad 
result’ rather than on a potentially generative change in the making.  In this way, 
Dewey’s analysis resonates with Sedgwick’s (1996, 2003) account of ‘paranoid’ 
modes of critical interpretation.  Not only is exposing ‘the bad’, or producing 
greater knowledge about it, insufficient to produce meaningful change, Sedgwick 
argues, but, actually, repeated acts of highlighting ‘the bad’, and mimetically 
tracing its contours, often work precisely to reproduce its force.  Additionally, 
because many of the mechanisms that enable and perpetuate behavior operate 
below the level of consciousness - and indeed, most habitual gestures are 
powerful precisely because they have become automatic at an unconscious level  
- methods of transformative intervention that appeal exclusively to cognitive 
reason or critical reflexivity often miss the mark.  
 
While Dewey acknowledges the potential of affect to spark cognitive and 
embodied transformation, he is suspicious of the capacity for such change to be 
anything other than transitory.  As he argues, ‘impulse burns itself up.  Emotion 
cannot be kept at its full tide’ ([1922]2012: 101).  Ravaisson similarly addresses 
this tendency for affect to weaken over time in his discussion of the ‘double law’ 
of habit: ‘Prolonged or repeated sensation diminishes gradually and eventually 
fades away’, whereas ‘prolonged or repeated movement becomes easier, quicker 
and more assumed’ (Carlisle and Sinclair, 2008: 849, italics mine).  Although we 
might question the divide between ‘feeling’ and ‘action’ on which these thinkers 
relyxiii, their observations nonetheless highlight the limits of models of 
‘progressive’ social change premised exclusively on affective rupture or 
revolution.  As Dewey argues,  
 
Anyone with knowledge of the stability and force of habit will hesitate to 
propose or prophesy rapid and sweeping social changes. A social 
revolution may effect abrupt and deep alternations in external customs in 
legal and political institutions.  But the habits that are behind these 
institutions and that have, willy-nilly, been shaped by objective 
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conditions, the habits of thought and feeling are not so easily modified 
([1922]2012: 44).  
 
Thus, similar to strategies of social reform premised on moral instruction, those 
which over-invest in the force of affect often do not pay enough attention to the 
embodied and environmental conditions necessary for change to be 
incorporated as a productive capacity that might drive more enduring forms of 
transformation.  
 
How, then, can and does ‘progressive’ social change actually happen? What is 
required, Dewey argues, is a mode of critical intervention that addresses thought 
and embodied action, the conscious and the non-or-less than conscious, the 
individual and environmental conditions at once – that is, transformation at the 
level of habit.  Importantly, however, such modes of intervention cannot rely on 
the possibility of precise calculation; that is, on predictive modes of behavior 
modification that fixate on already known end-points.  So, concerning the 
example of posture, Dewey contends, 
 
We must stop even thinking of standing up straight. To think of it is fatal, 
for it commits us to the operation of an established habit of standing 
wrong. We must find an act within our power which is disconnected from 
any thought about standing. We must start to do another thing which on 
one side inhibits our falling into the customary bad position and on the 
other side is the beginning of a series of acts which may lead to the 
correct posture ([1922]2012: 18). 
 
Thus, linking back to Sedgwick, we could say that in Dewey’s understanding of 
social transformation premised on habit modification, meaningful change cannot 
depend on ‘paranoid’ modes of knowing and prediction or on a linear model of 
progress.  Indeed, for Dewey, you can only concentrate on the next possible step 
ahead, rather than fixing on a known end point in advance.  
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But might Dewey’s approach nonetheless be interpreted as teleological given 
that it requires some guiding idea of a desired result (i.e. ‘standing up straight’)? 
What seems important here is that, for Dewey, the ‘desired result’ can only ever 
be barely glimpsed; it never emerges in clear relief and cannot remain constant.  
An imagined progressive result or outcome may energise or re-direct a process 
(or set of processes) of material transformation, but with each new embodied 
intervention or modification at the level of habit this imagined outcome itself is 
re-configured.  In Dewey’s words, ‘A mariner does not sail towards the stars, but 
by noting the stars he is aided in conducting his present activity of sailing … 
activity will not cease when the port is attained, but merely the present direction 
of activity’ ([1922]2012: 89, italics mine).  From this perspective, ends must not 
be understood as endpoints at all; rather an end is a ‘series of acts viewed at a 
remote stage’ (17).  If we wish to approach social reform at the level of habit, 
Dewey argues, we require ‘intelligent inquiry to discover the means which will 
produce a desired result, and an intelligent invention to procure the means’ (15).  
Importantly, however, ‘intelligence’, can only ever be speculative of tendencies, 
rather than predictive of future outcomes, because ‘the present, not the future, is 
ours’ (82).  
 
Therefore, in Dewey’s understanding of the links between habit and social 
transformation, the present is not repeatedly deferred to a better imagined 
future; rather, the present is active, brimming with change - and yet impossible 
to fix or isolate from other temporalities.  As he puts it:  
 
‘Present’ activity is not a sharp narrow knife-blade in time. The present is 
complex, containing within itself a multitude of habits and impulses. It is 
enduring, a course of action, a process including memory, observation 
and foresight, a pressure forward, a glance backward and a look outward. 
(110)  
 
Thus, unlike the narratives of affective revolution via empathy, change is not 
imagined as ignited by (or contained within) one powerful spark of recognition; 
rather, it is conceived as immanent and ongoing.  Moreover, critical work on 
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habit disrupts any recourse to linear narratives of time because habit itself, as an 
embodied technology, folds together past, present and future.  As such, socio-
political engagement with habit does not seek a definitive break with the past (if 
such a feat were possible); rather, it draws on and reanimates the past ‘so that its 
latent possibilities can be realized and acted upon’ in the present (Weiss, 2008: 
6).xiv  In these ways, Dewey’s approach resonates with analyses of affect 
influenced by Spinoza and Deleuze, as well as particular approaches to affect in 
postcolonial, queer and feminist theory, which conceptualize change as 
happening from moment to moment, as the past is re-animated in the present; 
thus similarly disrupting linear accounts of time and progress.  The difference, 
perhaps, is that when greater attention is paid to habit alongside affect (or to 
their imbrication), we can gain greater purchase on the material processes and 
mechanisms through which affective potentials are transformed into embodied 
and infrastructural tendencies (or not).  Affect, arguably, cannot participate in 
enduring processes of materialisation without some degree of habituation or 
automation that emerges through the co-constitution of bodies and 
environments.  
 
In this vein, if change is conceived as immanent in Dewey’s framework, this is the 
case not only because human bodies and subjectivities are continually 
transforming as their habits modify and multiply, but also because habits 
themselves are formed through the ongoing constitutive interaction of subjects, 
objects, infrastructures and environments.  While habits work by adapting to a 
given environment (and taking aspects of it in), Dewey suggests, they also 
function to affect and reconfigure environments – and because ‘environment’ is 
always multiple, embodied habitus too ‘is plural’ ([1922]2012:24).xv  From this 
perspective, individual habits are not discrete or fully separable from social, 
institutional or environmental habits; rather, they are always intimately 
intertwined.   As Rebecca Coleman puts it, habit ‘involves matter’; that is, ‘a 
constitutive set of relations between bodies and environments’ (2014: 87, 
original italics).   As such, social change cannot be thought of as a project of 
changing the subject; instead, it needs to be approached as a process of adjusting 
‘mind-body-environmental assemblages’ (Bennett at al 2013: 12).  Moreover, 
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‘the subject’, while implicated in and constituted through such assemblages, can 
never be understood as a self-possessed, individual agent because, as Dewey 
puts it,  ‘there is no ready-made self behind activities’ ([1922]2012: 16).xvi  While 
these points certainly make grappling with the possibilities of socio-political 
transformation via habit a complex endeavor, they also indicate how Dewey’s 
approach differs from dominant neoliberal governmentalities of habit, which 
depend on instituting self-discipline and responsibility at the level of the 
individual without attention to (or indeed precisely as a means to avoid 
addressing) structural conditions and frameworks.  Furthermore, it is clear that, 
while affect might spark psychic or embodied disruption that plants the seeds for 
embodied and psychic change, the larger focus of transformative projects needs 
be on adjusting more expansive material assemblages - assemblages that we are 
imbricated in but can never master.   
 
These mediations on habit, stasis and change lead Dewey to formulate a 
suggestive understanding of social progress.  Progress, he argues, ‘means 
increase of present meaning, which involves multiplication of sensed distinctions 
as well as harmony, unification’ (110).  Indeed, if history shows progress at all, 
Dewey suggests, it is to be identified in ‘this complication and extension of 
significance found within experience’ - and this enhancement of experience 
comes with our ability (in conjunction with existing infrastructures and 
environmental conditions) to generate ‘intelligent’ habits that coordinate and 
expand our productive capacities in the world (110).  Clearly, this is quite a 
different understanding of progress than that which animates many 
contemporary projects of social justice.  Unlike liberal narratives of empathy, 
which often implicitly pose an endpoint at which socio-political conflicts have 
been resolved and grievances adjudicated, Dewey’s vision of progress is one that 
‘brings no surcease, no immunity from perplexity and trouble’ (110-11).  It does 
not, then, imagine progress as tethered to an ideal (faraway) future, nor does it 
assume conflict can (or should) be banished from the workings of embodied 
subjectivity or socio-political life.  Moreover, for Dewey, ethical imperatives or 
political goods cannot be known in advance of social relations in any clear or 
calculated way.  In other words, while engaged in speculative modes of 
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‘foreseeing’ the near future, Dewey’s approach is nonetheless fundamentally 
open to the unanticipated, and hence, to change.xvii  It appreciates how habits, as 
Grosz puts it, ‘provide the ability to change one’s tendencies, to reorient one’s 
actions and to address the new, to be able to experience the unexpected’ (2008: 
221).  As such, this understanding of progress is less future-oriented than it is 
attuned to inhabiting the present in all its ambivalence and complexity.   
 
In these ways, we might say that Dewey’s approach resounds with what 
Sedgwick called ‘reparative’ modes of interpretation.  While Sedgwick was 
certainly critical of paranoia in social and cultural analysis, it is important to 
point out that her argument was not that we should (or could) do away with 
paranoid modes of interpretation.  Rather, she was concerned to highlight how, 
when ‘understood to be a mandatory injunction’, this particular style of critical 
analysis habitually marginalises other ways of doing critical theory – especially 
recourse to reparative analysis (2003: 130).  Scholars have interpreted 
Sedgwick’s call for reparative reading practices in a variety of different ways – 
most commonly perhaps as an imperative to approach our research objects with 
an affective orientation of nurturance, love and a desire to provide sustenance, 
rather than paranoia and suspicion.  Yet I find most compelling and productive 
those readings that figure reparation as an interpretive practice concerned with 
inhabiting ambivalence (Wiegman, 2014; Stacey, 2014) - or, in Sedgwick’s words, 
with accepting ‘the simple, foundational, authentically very difficult 
understanding that good and bad tend to be inseparable at every level’ (2011: 
136).  As an affective and analytical practice, inhabiting ambivalence requires 
relinquishing certainty and the possibility of calculated predication, and thus 
being open to the possibility of surprise and change.xviii  Importantly, from 
Sedgwick’s perspective, it is precisely in learning how to inhabit (rather than 
transcend) ambivalence, conflict and complexity that we might move from 
simply diagnosing ‘bad habits’ to the difficult and productive work of creating 
new tendencies – ones that might take us to a different (and more affirmative) 




The politics of habit  
 
Of course, my discussion of Dewey, Ravaisson and Sedgwick - and the opening 
out to habit their work suggests - leaves many important questions unanswered: 
If the socio-political imperative is to develop new habits, what should these 
habits be?  Who should decide?  How can they be implemented?  What would a 
mass project of habit modification look like? Would it even be desirable? How 
could such efforts both involve and exceed ‘the subject’?  And how might 
complex mind-body-environmental assemblages be identified and adjusted?   
 
In many senses, these are difficult and potentially dangerous questions with 
which to engage.  As acknowledged earlier, governing through habit has long 
been tethered to oppressive aims.xix   If we are looking for examples of mass 
projects of habit modification, Lisa Blackman suggests, Nazi Germany provides a 
chilling example.  Popular susceptibility to, and investment in, the fascism of the 
National Socialist party, she argues, was produced in part through the 
orchestration of rhythm, habit and the ‘hypnotizing use of repetition’ calculated 
‘to facilitate processes of suggestion and imitation’ (2013: 202).  Moving to the 
contemporary realm, we might also consider how states and corporations work 
to adjust our rhythms and habits in the interests of global capitalism – speeding 
up or slowing down the pace of work and leisure (Freeman, 2010), and 
‘privileging good habits (saving, wise investment, healthy lifestyles) and 
punishing bad ones (the criminalization of drug addiction, the medicalization of 
many other types of addiction)’ to suit the varying needs of the economy (Grosz, 
2013:233-4).  The productive capacities of habit to contribute to ‘progressive’ 
social transformation are not easily severed from these troubling practices of 
discipline, control and violence.  
 
My argument, however, is that, while habit’s troubling legacies should be 
foregrounded - not least because of their workings in the present - they are not 
deterministic or foreclosing of habit’s potential.  As Sara Ahmed argues, 
embodied and affective capacities that ‘depend upon a preexisting openness to 
others; a capacity to be affected and directed by an encounter’ are always 
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amenable to instrumentalisation for oppressive or exclusionary aims.  However, 
‘we need not let the reduction of capacity be our reduction.  Capacities might 
exceed the ends to which they have been directed’ (2014: 48-49).  Indeed, the 
most powerful bodily and sensorial techniques and practices are equally 
available to different political ideologies.  The fact that technologies of habit have 
been employed in the interests of oppressive ideologies does mean that they can 
only be; in fact, the political Left might rather see this as evidence for the political 
urgency of re-appropriating the material force of habit and habituation. 
 
Yet even if habit need not be associated exclusively with projects of colonialism, 
fascism or global capitalism, the question remains of what kind of distinctions 
between people or groups a focus on habit may (re)produce.  While Dewey 
suggests that social transformation requires the work of adjusting mind-body-
environment assemblages (rather than targeting individual subjects), he also 
argues that habit modification requires ‘order, discipline and manifest technique’ 
([1922]2012: 10).  The challenge of moral judgment, he contends, is ‘one of 
discriminating the complex of acts and habits into tendencies which are to be 
specifically cultivated and condemned’ (23) – a task best guided by ‘intelligent’ 
observation and speculation.  From Bennett’s perspective, Dewey’s work thus 
risks shoring up ‘a distinction within the body politic between those who 
combine thought and habit and are therefore able to reflexively monitor their 
own conduct and those who, subject entirely to the regimes of habit, are to be 
governed through mechanisms which reinforce its rigors of unreflexive 
repetition’ (2013: 108).  How, we must ask, is the capacity for embodied 
‘intelligence’ likely to be judged as unevenly distributed and what social and geo-
political hierarchies and exclusions might follow? 
 
Much of what Dewey has to say in Human Nature and Conduct, however, suggests 
that a key objective of democratic governance should be to cultivate conditions 
whereby ‘intelligence’ (an embodied appreciation of the significance of one’s 
present actions and an openness to change) might become a capacity available to 
all.  ‘In theory’, he argues, ‘democracy should be a means of stimulating original 
thought, and of evoking action deliberately adjusted in advance to cope with new 
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forces’ (italics mine, [1922]2012: 29).  Furthermore, in its attention to how 
‘conduct is always shared’, Dewey’s analysis opens up consideration of how 
habits link embodied subjects together in ways that might support the 
development of progressive movements and solidarities (11).  Such connections 
are not necessarily (or only) about synchronicity or being together in rhythm – 
which can function to exclude those who are deemed ‘out of time’ (Ahmed, 
2014); they are more about the imbrication and ‘cooperation’ of bodies with 
other bodies, as well as objects, infrastructures and environments (Dewey, 
[1922]2012).   From this perspective, the potential exists for ‘intelligent’ 
engagement with habit to furnish more affirmative individual and collective 
practices, wherein ‘progress’ is defined not as neoliberal disciplining of self-
conduct in line with normative politico-economic imperatives, but rather, as an 
ongoing process of adding ‘fullness and distinctness’ of ‘meaning’ to embodied 
experience (110).  How this potential might be actualised in current socio-
political and economic conditions, however, is precisely the challenge with which 
we must grapple.  
 
Questions may also be asked regarding the kind of ‘progress’ a focus on habit 
affirms and enables.  As discussed, Dewey (similar to Ravaisson, Deleuze, Grosz 
and others) offers a non-teleological vision of progress focused on the ongoing 
enhancement of embodied significance and cooperative bodily-environmental 
functioning, rather than achievement of already known endpoints.  The nature of 
progressive ethical or political conduct cannot, from this perspective, be fully 
known in advance.  Yet, with respect to the workings of social injustice, are there 
not, by now, some things we can quite clearly know in advance?  Can we not say 
confidently, for instance, that fewer men subjecting their female partners to 
domestic violence in the UK, or that fewer African Americans being killed by the 
police in the US, or that fewer people subjecting to grinding poverty and 
infectious diseases transnationally would constitute ‘progress’?   Indeed, in its 
rejection of  ‘known’ political truths or ethical principles, does this critical work 
on the transformative potential of habit risk an erasure of history, a forgetting of 
destructive cultural, socio-political and economic patterns we have seen repeat 
again and again?  Does not the relentless reproduction of gendered abuse, 
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institutional racism and global economic inequality make a so-called ‘paranoid’ 
approach to social and cultural theory and praxis all the more vital?  And is it not 
crucial that we keep exposing - and militantly fighting against – these kinds of 
injustices in a context in which those in positions of power (states, corporations, 
right-wing media etc.) mobilise immense influence and resources precisely to 
(re)produce, hide or misrepresent them? 
 
In response to these kinds of concerns, it is essential to underscore that any 
potentially affirmative use of habit in approaching the contemporary 
possibilities of social transformation cannot participate in a politics of historical 
erasure.  A critical politics of habit must also be able to grapple meaningfully 
with the embodied and socio-political specificities of gendered, sexualised, 
racialised, classed and geopolitical inequality and exclusion - points which 
highlight the necessity of reading Dewey, Ravaisson and other scholars of habit 
alongside (and through) critical feminist, queer and decolonial analysis.   In 
principle, however, given that the ‘nature of habit is to be assertive, insistent and 
self-perpetuating’ (Dewey, [1922]2012: 26), attending to the logics of habit 
should make us more, rather than less, attentive to the workings of systemic and 
endemic abuses of power.xx  Importantly, Dewey’s critique of calculative 
prediction as a method of charting social change is not a disavowal of the 
salience of knowledge gleaned from past observation and experience – indeed, 
his advocacy of intelligent ‘forseeing’ in the adjustment of habits is premised 
precisely on careful analysis of the outcomes and implications of previous 
(re)actions.  What is vital, however, is that efforts to ‘forsee’ are flexible and 
speculative, rather than rigid and calculative, so that they can account for ‘the 
role of accident’ and remain open to the unexpected (23).  As Sedgwick (1996, 
2003) argues, when we are too confident about what we already know, and 
therefore about what is necessary to ameliorate suffering and produce ‘positive’ 
transformation, we risk becoming blind to change itself when it is actually 
happening.  We do need paranoia, Sedgwick suggests, but it should not be our 
only analytical mode-mood, and when we mobilise ‘paranoid’ forms of 
interpretation, we might gain from making them more adaptable and intuitive.  
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As a means to negotiate the possibilities of affirmative social change, a politics of 
habit resonates in important ways with a critical pragmatist approach that 
addresses mind-body-environmental assemblages through provisional socio-
political goals pursued on multiple interconnected fronts.  That is, a politics 
committed to, as William Connolly puts it, ‘the need for multiform activism’ that 
‘folds an ethos of cultivation into political practices set on several interceded 
scales: local, familiar, workplace, state, theological, corporate, global and 
planetary’ (2013: 6).  Given the unconscious nature of most forms of individual-
collective habituation, emphasis may be best placed on ‘indirect’ techniques that 
address the ‘political, social, physical, economic, psychological, aesthetic and 
other’ environments that ‘feed’ habits (Sullivan, 2005: 9; see also Dewey, 
[1922]2012: 13).  Yet, as environments and embodied subjects are co-
constituted through habit, there is also need for experimental ‘technologies of 
the self’ (Foucault, 1988) that, through collective elaboration, might play a role in 
cultivating different politico-ethical habits, sensibilities and forms of attunement 
(Connolly, 2002, 2013; Spivak, 2012).  Engaging politically with the repression 
and ambivalence central to our most pervasive (and often invisible) embodied 
habits requires a pragmatism informed by critical psychosocial theories and 
practices (Young, 1990; Sedgwick, 2003; Sullivan, 2005).  At the same time, 
approaching human subjects as contingent components of mind-body-
environmental assemblages calls for material techniques that appreciate the 
imbrication of embodied beings with diverse geographies, architectures and 
infrastructures, including economic and digital ones (Latour, 2005; Bennett, 
2013, 2015; Amoore, 2013).  In other words, engaging politically through habit 
demands an open-ended, interdisciplinary, materialist approach.  
 
As a politics oriented towards the present, pragmatism is wary of over-
investment in models of revolutionary change that promise to overthrow the 
entire system, not least because, in a complex and shifting transnational world, 
there is no arguably no singular or self-sustaining ‘system’ to overthrow.  As 
Connolly argues, contemporary economic and socio-political structures and 
relations are ‘replete with too many loose ends, uneven edges, dicey 
intersections with nonhuman forces, and uncertain trajectories to make such a 
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wholesale project plausible’ (2013: 42).  Instead, the focus is on a ‘set of interim 
possibilities’, pursued simultaneously in several interconnected arenas, which 
‘combine an experimental temper with the appreciation that living and acting 
into the future inevitably contain a shifting quotient of certainty’ (42, 37).  A 
politics of habit, then, seeks transformation on the urgent issues of the day, but 
also aims to sense and adapt to change as it happens.  Moving beyond the 
exposure or disruption of damaging or stultifying individual and collective 
habits, it focuses on cultivating the productive capacity of habituation to support 
processes of becoming ‘otherwise’.  
 
Yet if the pragmatist thrust of a politics of habit reorients our investment in the 
promise of revolutionary change, where does this leave radical and utopian 
thinking?  Do we not require radical praxis to move beyond the status quo and 
towards genuine socio-political democracy, freedom and affirmation of 
difference?  These are crucial questions, especially given longstanding critiques 
of Dewey’s approach – and pragmatism more generally - which accuse him of 
prescribing ‘liberal reform’ (rather than radical change) that deliberately avoids 
direct critique of ideological assumptions and structural relations of power 
(Paringer, 1990; Sullivan, 2005).  Similar to Ravaisson, Dewey’s work is not 
available for contemporary critical use without political ‘baggage’ and risk.  
However, as this paper has begun to illustrate, we are now seeing a radical re-
interpretation of pragmatist thought - one that’s affinities lie not with political 
liberalism but rather with a renewed critical empiricism that grapples with the 
possibilities of meaningful political and ethical intervention in a world composed 
of new and changing configurations of social life, materiality, temporality and 
agency.xxi  In the aftermath of post-structuralism, varied re-engagements with 
pragmatism are mining the work of Dewey, James and others for the tools they 
offer for developing modes of socio-political analysis and ethical-material 
practice that work beyond the tropes of evidence and exposure.  While a politics 
of habit must not (and cannot) disengage from the ideological and the structural, 
the fact that Dewey’s work is not reducible to ‘ideology critique’ is part of what 
makes it amenable to reinterpretation that approaches social thought and 
political praxis otherwise to (or in excess of) the hermeneutics of suspicion.  This 
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does not mean, of course, that we should endorse Dewey or his style of 
pragmatism wholesale; rather, the emphasis here is on critical (pragmatic?) 
reinterpretation appropriate for the contemporary socio-political, cultural and 
economic conjuncture.   
 
From my perspective, a critical focus on habit need not invalidate the importance 
of radical thought or revolutionary politics.  As Robin D. G. Kelley (2002) argues, 
it is the unbounded imagination and audacious hope of radical thought that 
enables those who are marginalised to envision a life far beyond their present 
conditions, to recognise powerfully that things could be otherwise.  What a 
politics of habit can usefully do, however, is compel us to ‘suture to eventual and 
the endemic’ (Dewsbury and Bissell, 2015: 23) – to appreciate how affective and 
political breaks or surges are (sometimes fleeting and sometimes much more 
significant) moments in ongoing and uneven processes of material collaboration, 
struggle and experimentation.  As Dewey’s work suggests, revolutionary action is 
necessary and vital in particular circumstances, and can lead to lasting change.  
The point, however, is that when revolutions are ‘successful’, it is because 
‘appropriate habits of thought have previously been insensibly matured’ 
([1922]2012: 44).  In these circumstances, ‘the external change merely registers 
the removal of an external superficial barrier to the operation of existing 
intellectual tendencies’ (42).  This is why the most significant and influential 
modern social movements – from the American civil rights movement to 
transnational feminism - have engaged in hybrid forms of political engagement, 
combining the ‘shock to thought’ of revolutionary action with the longer term 
cultivation of new habits, rhythms and forms of embodied coordination.xxii   
 
Imagination, affect and habit can thus be vital collaborators in the workings of 
social transformation.  For Dewey, like James and Ravaisson, affect plays a vital 
role in alerting us to the disruption of usually smooth-running habits, and hence, 
to the workings of change.  It signals the emergence of ‘gaps, intervals and blips’ 
in habitual practice, which function as ‘actionable spaces’; that is, junctures 
‘affording the opportunity for new forms of practice to be improvised’ (Bennett, 
2013: 126, 125; see also Bennett, 2015; Shilling, 2008).  While the force of affect 
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alone may not be sufficient to engender enduring forms of social transformation, 
it can help establish new embodied capacities and material assemblages, 
including those premised on empathic imagination and attunement between 
bodies (Bennett, 2006; Author, 2014a).  Moreover, theories of affect influenced 
by Spinoza and Deleuze overlap with Dewey’s speculative approach to habit 
modification: In different ways, they explore the productive potential of 
suspending established ‘solutions’ and ways of knowing to develop alternative 
modes of approaching social and ethical problems – perhaps reconfiguring ‘the 
problem’ in the process.  We might also consider the salient affective qualities of 
habits deemed potentially conducive to affirmative forms of socio-political 
relationality and cohabitation  – from Dewey’s habits of ‘amicable cooperation’ 
([1939]1976), to Paul Gilroy’s dynamics of multicultural ‘conviviality’ (2004), to 
Judith Butler’s ethics of ‘unwilled cohabitation’ (2012).xxiii   What all of this 
suggests is that, in making sense of the complex dynamics and possibilities of 
social stasis and transformation today, we need to think mind and body; affect 
and habit; paranoia and reparation; the revolutionary and the pragmatic; the 
eventual and the endemic together.  We need to do so, moreover, in ways which 
understand the imbrication of cognitive, affective and physiological processes 
with political and environmental conditions and infrastructures in temporalities 




This article has explored how bringing critical analysis of habit together with 
contemporary writing on affect and emotion might offer a richer framework for 
grappling with the material logics, challenges and potentials of social and 
political change today.  Turning to habit is productive because it attunes us 
simultaneously to the powerful automated processes and mechanisms 
underlying the tendency for patterns of oppression and inequality to persist and 
the necessary, yet counterintuitive, role of automation and habituation in 
enabling more enduring forms of socio-political transformation.  Thinking habit, 
affect, embodiment, environment and infrastructure relationally through the 
work of Dewey, Ravaisson, Sedgwick and others, my analysis has suggested, 
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opens out to forms of social and cultural theory and praxis that see change as 
working through mind-body-environmental assemblages and understand 
‘progress’ as an experiential possibility in the present (rather than an ideal of the 
faraway future).  This focus on inhabiting the present is important, I have argued, 
because of the ways in which it can enhance our attunement to socio-political 
complexity and ambivalence and the experiential qualities of ‘progress’ and 
‘regress’, while better enabling us to sense change as it happens.  Embodied 
attentiveness to the activity of the present, moreover, is what orients us towards 
the collective, reparative work of creating new, potentially affirmative, 
tendencies, rather than merely diagnosing ‘bad habits’.   As a project of social 
justice, this involves political work and material practice that sutures the 
revolutionary and the routine and appreciates the co-constitution of imagination, 




i See Sedgwick, 1996, 2003; 2011; Latour, 2002; Felski, 2015. 
ii See Sullivan, 2006; Malabou, 2008; Shilling, 2008; Weiss, 2008; Bennett et al, 2013, Grosz, 2013. 
iii See also Wiegman, 2014; Stacey, 2014; Author, 2014b; Felski, 2015. 
iv See Author, 2012a, 2013, 2014a. 
v See Bennett et al., eds. 2013; Sparrow and Hutchinson eds. 2013; Carlisle, 2014; Dewsbury and 
Bissell, eds. 2015. 
vi See also Bennett, 2013, 2015. 
vii See Thaler and Sunstein, 2008. 
viii Although, as Natasha Dow Schüll, notes, the ‘nudge’ approach does not quite fit the standard 
neoliberal model of individual responsibilization: it ‘assumes a choosing subject, but one who is 
constitutionally ill equipped to make rational, healthy choices’.  As such, nudge ‘both 
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submission, responsibility and discipline’ (2016: 12). 
ix For Deleuze, in Difference and Repetition ([1968]2011) - a key text for the renewed interest in 
habit in critical theory and continental philosophy - the fundamental intertwinement of 
repetition with singularity and the production of difference means that ‘habit never gives rise to 
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can possess a divine gift when it is given to them, and are even able to cultivate it through their 
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own actions.’  However, understanding habit in this way also ‘avoids the implication that it is 
entirely up to individuals to actualize the divinely infused habitus, since this has its own 
momentum. This means that someone who receives grace can consider it her own, while 
remaining aware that it is God’s power that moves through her when she is inclined to do good’ 
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xii See also Shilling, 2008; Weiss, 2008; Coleman, 2014.  
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can ‘engender a heightening of experience rather than a diminution of feeling’ (82).  As such, the 
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xiv See also Grosz, 2013; Carlisle, 2014. 
xv See also Shilling, 2008; Grosz, 2013; Coleman, 2014. 
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assemblages, from Henri Lefevre’s analysis of everyday life and the social production of the city, 
to Bruno Latour’s Actor Network Theory, to various ‘new’ materialisms. 
xvii Dewey’s approach here again overlaps with theories of affect influenced by Spinoza and 
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